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will have to save that story for another day.) Paul Volcker, as chair of the Federal Reserve Board, predictably receives a great deal of praise for putting the brakes on escalating inflation. Although appointed by President Jimmy Carter in 1979, Volcker is viewed as a member of Reagan's team of farsighted economic managers.
One chapter in particular stands out. Wigmore provides an insightful analysis of the origins of the so-called "junk bond" market in the early 1980s. Along with the rise of mutual funds as investment vehicles for millions of middle-income American households, the creation of an active market for corporate bonds with subpar credit ratings must rank as one of the genuinely revolutionary transformations linked to the financial services sector during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Michael Milken was instrumental in nurturing this emerging market, and the author grants the famous financier full credit for his innovative accomplishments. Ironically, the violation of securities laws that sent Milken to prison had little connection to the junk bond market; instead, his transgressions were linked to common stocks believed to be in play during the merger and acquisitions mania of the 1980s.
One oddity is that Wigmore announces at the outset that his theoretical framework is Keynesian economics. This jarring statement may be off-putting to some readers, but once the narrative begins, most traces of that interpretive approach seem to be largely forgottenwhich is just as well under the circumstances. The strategy is reasonable, notable as a kind of shy insurgency. It is an argument a fortiori, "from the stronger." If I show you that two is less than ten then it is easy to persuade you a fortiori that two is less than twenty. If I show you that what you think is a burden of the welfare state is actually small, or badly estimated, or a benefit, then it is less difficult to persuade you that rolling back the welfare state requires sober thinking about the alternatives. In a literature loaded with true believers-rivaled perhaps only by the economic history of slavery-an argument a fortiori makes the insurgent the virtuous. Atkinson gets close to the ideal, examining openly and in public the facts and the models while inviting readers to test cherished hypotheses against them.
In "Welfare State and Economic Performance" (ch. 2) the author assesses a dozen econometric studies of the relation between welfare state spending and macroeconomic 
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Listen to almost any political speech and you will hear someone argue that "saving Social Security" is at the top of their agenda. The nation's top policy makers, as well as much of the public, have apparently come to believe that our system of social insurance for the elderly and disabled is in crisis and needs fairly radical reform. This short volume clearly and convincingly argues otherwise. Instead, many will come away from the book convinced that the program needs to be rigorously shielded from those who would save it.
The book is structured as a polemic against those who claim the system is poised for an imminent crisis, wherein it will be unable to meet its fiduciary obligations to future retirees. After a comprehensive introduction outlining the main arguments, each chapter thoroughly explores one dimension of the alleged crisis. The book thus provides the reader with an excellent working knowledge of both sides of the debate. For example, in their discussion of the methodological flaws in generational accounting research-an area of work that has provided a rationale for "reforming" Social Security-we learn a great deal about the methods and findings of this research.
